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Expanding Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado to Protect
Criminal Defendants from Explicit Gender
Animus
I. INTRODUCTION
Equal opportunity to participate in the fair administration of
justice is fundamental to our democratic system. It not only
furthers the goals of the jury system. It reaffirms the promise
of equality under the law—that all citizens, regardless of
race, ethnicity, or gender, have the chance to take part
directly in our democracy. When persons are excluded from
participation in our democratic processes solely because of
race or gender, this promise of equality dims, and the
integrity of our judicial system is jeopardized. 1

In 2017, the United States Supreme Court extinguished
explicit racial animus expressed during juror deliberations
criminal trials. 2 Though courts have repeatedly cloaked the jury’s
deliberation room—essentially, “black box”—in impenetrable
armor, Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez leveraged the American
promise of equality, piercing a juror’s animus and bringing it
within reach of the Court.3 His case established that protection of
the jury’s black box decision making must yield to an even more
fundamental protection: the equal protection of the law and the

J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2020. Editor-inChief of the Arkansas Law Review, 2019-2020. This author sincerely thanks
Professor Alex Nunn, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas
School of Law, for his thoughtful guidance, feedback, and wisdom during the
drafting process. The author would also like to thank the remarkable editors
of the Arkansas Law Review for their attention to detail and precision while
editing. Finally, the author thanks her family and friends for their continual
support, encouragement, interest, and love.
1. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 145-46 (1994).
2. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 871 (2017) (“The Nation
must continue to make strides to overcome race-based discrimination. The
progress that has already been made underlies the Court’s insistence that
blatant racial prejudice is antithetical to the functioning of the jury system and
must be confronted in egregious cases like this one despite the general bar of
the no-impeachment rule.”).
3. Id. at 861.
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right to a fair and impartial trial by jury. 4 Namely, the PenaRodriguez v. Colorado+ decision fractured the “no impeachment”
doctrine and Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), for the first time
permitting post-trial juror testimony to expose racial bias. 5
Ultimately, it provided a mechanism for criminal defendants to
obtain a new—and impartial—trial. 6
But Peña-Rodriguez’s narrow exception should not be
viewed in isolation. Within our nation’s history exists a deeplyrooted phenomenon: the liberation of and extension of rights to
African-Americans is often mirrored by the liberation of and
extension of rights to American women. 7 Historically, where an
inequality based on race has been identified and reconciled, the
same inequality based on gender is subsequently identified and
reconciled. 8 The liberation of women and the demand for gender
equality followed the liberation of African-Americans and the
demand for racial equality. 9
Demonstrations nationwide
highlighted disadvantages similarly-held by African-Americans
and women, such as prohibitions from holding elected positions,
voting, serving on juries, independently bringing suit, holding or
conveying property, and serving as legal guardians of their own
children.10 A basic outlay of American history demonstrates that
4. Id. (“A general rule has evolved to give substantial protection to verdict
finality and to assure jurors that, once their verdict has been entered, it will not
later be called into question based on the comments or conclusions they
expressed during deliberations.”). The Court further opined that such
statements of explicit racial bias would, if left unaddressed, “risk systemic
injury to the administration of justice.” Id. at 868. Further, “[a]n effort to
address the most grave and serious statements of racial bias is not an effort to
perfect the jury but to ensure that our legal system remains capable of coming
ever closer to the promise of equal treatment under the law that is so central to
a functioning democracy.” Id.
+
Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez’s name appears with and without a
tilde throughout this Note. This variation is not accidental, but rather
represents the variations present throughout his case’s procedural history.
However, the correct spelling of his last name includes the tilde.
5. See generally Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
6. Id. at 870-71 (though the Court noted that it “need not address, what
procedures a trial court must follow when confronted with a motion for a new
trial based on juror testimony of racial bias”).
7. See discussion infra Section III.
8. Id.
9. See infra footnotes 130-53 and accompanying text.
10. Id.
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where there is no tolerance for race-based discrimination, there is
also no room for the existence of gender-based discrimination.
This Note begins by outlining the evolution of Federal Rule
of Evidence 606(b), tracing its origins from the rigid English
Mansfield Rule to a period of uncertainty in the late 19th and early
20th century. The focus of this history is to show that although
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) appears absolute, courts
nationwide have long recognized competing interests within the
criminal justice system. 11 This Note will then depict how the
grant of fundamental rights to women followed that of African
Americans, emphasizing specifically the development of
protections regarding peremptory challenges through an analysis
of key cases such as Batson v. Kentucky12 and J.E.B. v.
Alabama.13
Because American history has recognized both racial and
gender discrimination as egregious, worthy of amelioration
through similar means, the Court’s rejection of explicit racial
animus must expand to also reject explicit gender animus. This
Note argues that the fair administration of justice and the integrity
of our judicial system14 necessitate a jury free from explicit racial
and gender animus. Ultimately, this Note will argue that the
protection identified in 2017 by the United States Supreme Court
in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 15 which permitted the admittance
of post-trial juror testimony revealing explicit racial animus
during juror deliberations, must also be extended to permit
admittance of juror testimony revealing explicit gender animus.

11. See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1851) (“[C]ases
might arise in which it would be impossible to refuse [juror affidavits
impeaching their verdict] without violating the plainest principles of
justice . . . .”).
12. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
13. See generally J.E.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); see also Jason Koffler,
Laboratories of Equal Justice: What State Experience Portends for Expansion
of Pena-Rodriguez Exception Beyond Race, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 6 (2018)
(looking to the line of cases following Batson v. Kentucky, as well as to state
cases addressing biases, and explaining that Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado can
expand to gender and religion).
14. Id. at 145-46.
15. See generally Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855.
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II. THE NO-IMPEACHMENT DOCTRINE: A HISTORY
Courts in the United States have a longstanding history of
prohibiting, in large part, post-trial juror testimony. Though the
modern protectionary rule is today codified as Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b), 16 or the “no-impeachment doctrine,” its origins
trace back to English common-law.17

A. THE MANSFIELD RULE
During the early modern era, it was routine for early English
courts to permit a juror’s affidavit or testimony without
equivocation. 18
In 18th century England, however, Lord
Mansfield first established what became known as the “Mansfield
Rule.”19 In Vaise v. Delaval, Lord Mansfield was forced to
consider a defendant’s motion to set aside a verdict reached after
indecisive jurors tossed a coin to determine his innocence or
guilt.20 Despite the atrociousness of the jury’s actions, Lord
Mansfield unequivocally declared that the common law
prohibited a juror’s affidavit in support of the defendant’s
motion.21 Although Lord Mansfield acknowledged that the
jurors’ coin toss constituted misconduct, he opined that the Court
should not derive its knowledge of that misconduct from a juror’s
post-trial affidavit.22
The Mansfield Rule was thus premised on the doctrine that
a person should not “be heard to allege his own turpitude.”23 That
16. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
17. Jessica L. West, 12 Racist Men: Post-Verdict Evidence of Juror Bias,
27 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 165, 171 (2011).
18. See Norman v. Beamont (1744) 125 Eng. Rep. 1281, 1282
(explaining that the court “always admitted” post-trial juror affidavits
regarding “a misbehaviour of any of the jury, or any declaration made by any
of [the jurors] either before or after the verdict to shew that a juryman was
partial”); see also Phillips v. Fowler (1735) 94 Eng. Rep. 998; Metcalfe v.
Deane (1590) 78 Eng. Rep. 445.
19. West, supra note 17.
20. Vaise v. Delaval (1785) 99 Eng. Rep. 944.
21. Id.
22. Id. (explaining that the court should instead get information regarding
juror misconduct “from some person having seen the [misconduct] through a
window, or by such other means”).
23. Ronald L. Carlson & Steven M. Sumberg, Attacking Jury Verdicts:
Paradigms for Rule Revision, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 247, 248 (1978).
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is, a juror should not be asked to testify to misconduct in which
he and his fellow jurors partook.24 This rationale would later
become the broad rule to which courts nationwide are now
familiar: “A juror may not impeach his own verdict.”25 The
Mansfield Rule distinguished between a juror’s testimony and
that of a third-party actor, preventing a juror from testifying
against his fellow jurors.26 It enacted a stringent ban on juror
testimony, even where there was severe and damaging
misconduct by the jury; but its absolutism and rigidity gave rise
to subsequent criticism. 27 Critics have said that the Mansfield
Rule was “neither strictly correct as a statement of the
acknowledged law nor at all defensible upon any principle in this
unqualified form” and that it was a “mere shibboleth and [had] no
intrinsic signification whatever.” 28

B. UNCERTAINTY IN THE REGIME
Though courts in the United States were hesitant to disrupt
the finality of jury verdicts by way of juror testimony or
affidavit,29 they were also hesitant to adopt the Mansfield Rule in
its strict and expansive form.30 Many jurisdictions did adopt the
Mansfield Rule in a limited form, but those jurisdictions provided
flexibility for situations in which principles of justice required
jurors’ testimony to correct juror misconduct or error.31 In United
States v. Reid, for example, the United States Supreme Court
foresaw that circumstances might arise in which it would be
“impossible” to refuse post-trial juror testimony without
“violating the plainest principles of justice.”32 This opinion,
24. Id. at 249.
25. Christopher B. Mueller, Jurors’ Impeachment of Verdicts and
Indictments in Federal Court under Rule 606(b), 57 NEB. L. REV. 920, 924
(1978).
26. Id. at 954-55.
27. Fraser Holmes, Becoming Penelopes: Rethinking the Federal NoImpeachment Rule After Peña-Rodriguez, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1053, 1055 (2018).
28. Id.
29. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1851) (explaining that posttrial juror testimony to impeach a verdict should “always be received with great
caution”).
30. Mueller, supra note 25 at 924-25.
31. Id. at 925.
32. Reid, 53 U.S. at 366.

530

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72:2

providing that the Mansfield Rule is not always appropriate and
must sometimes yield in the interest of justice, represented the
first departure from the rigidity of the Old English common law
regime.33
Fifteen years following Reid—and after years of legal
uncertainty within Iowa state courts—the Supreme Court of Iowa
expressly rejected the absolutism of the Mansfield Rule. 34 The
court instead issued a concise rule, remedying Iowa’s history of
uncertainty regarding the no-impeachment rule while also
establishing a model rule to which the rest of the United States
would look.35 This rule acknowledged that though a jury’s
verdict should typically remain undisturbed, where there is juror
misconduct there is also “no sound public policy which should
prevent a court from hearing the best evidence of which the matter
is susceptible, in order to administer justice to the party whose
33. Colin Miller, Dismissed with Prejudice: Why Application of the AntiJury Impeachment Rule to Allegations of Racial, Religious, or Other Bias
Violates the Right to Present a Defense, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 872, 881 (2009).
34. See Wright v. Ill. & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 209-13 (Iowa 1866);
see also Lloyd v. McClure, 2 Greene 139 (Iowa 1849) (holding that a new trial
should not be granted unless it is “apparent” that “manifest injustice has been
done”); Abel v. Kennedy, 3 Greene 47, 49 (Iowa 1851) (holding that “no matter
how reprehensible and improper” the jury’s misconduct, jurors cannot
“impeach their verdict on their own affidavits or statements”); Forshee v.
Abrams, 2 Iowa 571, 579-80 (Iowa 1856) (opining that where the defendant
alleged the jury reached a quotient verdict, jurors’ affidavits—if given by the
jurors voluntarily—could be used to inquire into jury’s “unfair dealing”);
Cook, Sargent & Cook v. Sypher, 3 Iowa 484, 484 (Iowa 1856) (opining that
allowing jurors to impeach their own verdicts was a “dangerous practice,” but
that courts could receive juror affidavits in support of their reached verdict);
State v. Grady, 4 Iowa 461 (Iowa 1857) (expressing uncertainty as to whether
affidavits from jurors could be used to impeach their verdict).
35. Wright, 20 Iowa at 210 (“[A]ffidavits of jurors may be received for
the purpose of avoiding a verdict, to show any matter occurring during the trial
or in the jury room, which does not essentially inhere in the verdict itself, as
that a juror was improperly approached by a party, his agent, or attorney; that
witnesses or others conversed as to the facts or merits of the cause, out of court
and in the presence of jurors; that the verdict was determined by aggregation
and average or by lot, or game of chance or other artifice or improper manner;
but that such affidavit to avoid the verdict may not be received to show any
matter which does essentially inhere in the verdict itself, as that the juror did
not assent to the verdict; that he misunderstood the instructions of the court;
the statements of the witnesses or the pleadings in the case; that he was unduly
influenced by the statements or otherwise of his fellow jurors, or mistaken in
his calculations or judgment, or other matter resting alone in the juror’s
breast.”).
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rights have been prejudiced by such an unlawful act.”36 The court
differentiated between the mental processes of a jury member and
overt acts, opining that although an overt act can be disproven by
other jurors and proof of such misconduct would deter others
from behaving similarly, the mental processes of one juror are
“incapable of disproof” and thus must be protected.37
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, however, took an
alternate approach a mere five years later, conditioning the
admissibility of a juror’s post-trial testimony on whether the
conduct testified to occurred outside of the deliberation room or
inside of the deliberation room.38 The court emphasized juror
privacy and sought to protect jurors from “distrust,
embarrassment, or uncertainty” regarding their verdict.39 But
three years later, the Kansas Supreme Court adopted an approach
similar to that of Iowa when a juror drank alcohol during a trial
and was abusive to other jurors in the deliberation room. 40 Rather
than distinguishing between conduct inside or outside of the
deliberation room, the Kansas court defined admissibility by
differentiating between the “personal consciousness” and “overt
acts” of the individual juror.41
Less than two decades later, the United States Supreme
Court finally sought to provide a uniform rule given these varying
approaches, holding that where a newspaper article was
introduced to the jury and where the bailiff made prejudicial
comments about the defendant to the jury, “[p]rivate
communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third
persons, or witnesses, or the officer in charge, are absolutely
forbidden, and invalidate the verdict, at least unless their
harmlessness is made to appear.”42 This case, Mattox v. United
States, established that where there is an external influence—
36. Id. at 212.
37. Id. at 210-11.
38. Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, 453 (Mass. 1871).
39. Id. at 460.
40. Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539, 544-45 (Kan. 1874).
41. Id. (explaining that while “matters lying outside the personal
consciousness of the individual juror” cannot be contradicted by other jurors,
“overt acts” by one juror can either by contradicted or corroborated by the other
jury members).
42. Miller, supra note 33 at 884 (citing Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S.
140, 149-50 (1892)).
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”extraneous prejudicial information”—post-trial juror testimony
is admissible to impeach the verdict.43
Despite Mattox’s holding, however, uncertainty as to what
could or could not be admitted continued throughout the early 20th
century, with courts across the nation issuing diverging opinions.
For example, the United States Supreme Court in McDonald v.
Pless held that though Mattox prohibited extraneous influences
and thus created an exception allowing post-trial juror testimony
attesting to the presence of extraneous influence in deliberations,
this exception did not permit juror testimony regarding an
extraneous influence when admitted to impeach a quotient
verdict.44

C. THE CODIFICATION OF FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 606(B)
To remedy these inconsistencies, the Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States (“the Committee”) began drafting Rule 606(b)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, issuing its first draft in 1969. 45
This draft read:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment,
a juror may not testify concerning the effect of anything upon
his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him
to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or
concerning his mental processes in connection therewith.
Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him
indicating an effect of this kind be received for these
purposes.46

This draft largely channeled Iowa’s rule, differentiating between
“misconduct” within the mental processes of a juror and

43. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892).
44. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915) (explaining that where
the Court had to “choose between redressing the injury of the private litigant
and inflicting the public injury which would result if jurors were permitted to
testify as to what had happened in the jury room,” the “lesser of two evils” was
to prohibit post trial juror testimony).
45. See generally Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46
F.R.D. 161 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Draft].
46. Id. at 289-90.
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misconduct via an overt act.47 The Committee explicitly rejected
the unyielding Mansfield Rule—that a juror may never impeach
his own verdict—explaining that that rule was a “gross
oversimplification.”48
Though the Committee identified “freedom of deliberation,
stability and finality of verdicts” as well as the “protection of
jurors against annoyance and embarrassment” as values promoted
by prohibiting post-trial juror testimony, it also acknowledged
that “simply putting verdicts beyond effective reach [would] only
promote irregularity and injustice.”49 Juror testimony is often
critical, as jurors are the only persons present within
deliberations. 50 Therefore, the Committee opined, jurors should
be allowed to testify as to matters within deliberations but outside
of their privately-held rationales and processes—i.e. overt acts—
in reaching a verdict.51 Thus, the Committee declared its
proposed rule as an “accommodation” between the values worthy
of protection and the injustices worthy of prevention.52
In March of 1971, the Committee presented a revised version
of the Federal Rules of Evidence with modifications incorporated
from the 1969 draft.53 However, the language of Rule 606(b)
remained untouched.54 Later that same year, the draft was
“hastily rewritten” and presented by the Committee to the United
States Supreme Court, approved, then presented to Congress.55
Somewhat surprisingly, the new draft not only prohibited
testimony regarding arguments, statements, discussions, mental
47. Miller, supra note 33 at 886-87; 1969 Draft, supra note 45 (“The
trend has been to draw the dividing line between testimony as to mental
processes, on the one hand, and as to the existence of conditions or occurrences
of events calculated improperly to influence the verdict, on the other hand,
without regard to whether the happening is within or without the jury room.”).
48. 1969 Draft, supra note 45.
49. Id.
50. Miller, supra note 33 at 887.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See generally Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, 51
F.R.D. 315 (1971).
54. Id.
55. David A. Christman, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and The
Problem of “Differential” Jury Error, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 824 n.141
(1992) (explaining that the motivation for these last-minute provisions were
motivated by Senator McClellan and the Justice Department’s “extensive
lobbying efforts”).
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and emotional reactions, votes, and all other aspects of
deliberations, but also declared jurors incompetent to impeach
their verdicts using testimony concerning a compromise verdict,
a quotient verdict, speculation as to insurance coverage,
misinterpretation of instructions, mistake in returning the verdict,
or interpretation of a guilty plea by one defendant as implicating
others.56 Under this version, jurors could only testify as to
“prejudicial extraneous information” or information that was
“injected or brought to bear upon the deliberative process” by a
third-party.57
Though the House rejected this draft, advocating that juror
testimony regarding statements made during deliberations—such
as the abusive statements made by a juror in Perry—should be
admissible as in the 1969 and March of 1971 draft, the Senate
vehemently championed for 1971’s later version. 58 The Senate
cited McDonald,59 warning that if the House’s preferred version
of 606(b) were adopted, losing parties would be permitted to
harass former jurors or exploit “badly-motivated” ex-jurors.60
Congress ultimately adopted this later, more stringent version.61
Notably, however, the following text from the March 1971
draft remained:
This rule does not purport to specify the substantive grounds
for setting aside verdicts for irregularity; it deals only with
the competency of jurors to testify concerning those grounds.
Allowing them to testify as to matters other than their own
inner reactions involves no particular hazard to the values
sought to be protected. The rule is based upon this
conclusion. It makes no attempt to specify the substantive
grounds for setting aside verdicts for irregularity.62

The second sentence proffers that post-trial juror testimony
regarding matters other than those jurors’ own mental processes
poses no threat to the values—freedom of deliberation, stability
56. Miller, supra note 33 at 889.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. McDonald, 238 U.S. at 268-69.
60. Miller, supra note 33 at 890.
61. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098,
7102.
62. H.R. REP. NO. 93-65 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075,
7083 (emphasis added).
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and finality of verdicts, and the prevention of juror harassment—
protected by the no-impeachment doctrine.63

D. TANNER V. UNITED STATES
Though the no-impeachment doctrine—originating from
Lord Mansfield’s absolute prohibition and transforming,
broadening and constricting fluidly over the course of early
American history—was now codified in the Federal Rules of
Evidence,64 the doctrine would continue to transform in the
coming years. In 1987, for example, the United States Supreme
Court considered whether testimony that jurors were intoxicated
from consuming both alcohol and drugs during a trial was
admissible under the recently enacted Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b).65 Despite the egregiousness of the misconduct, the
Tanner court determined that the jurors’ consumption primarily
affected their internal mental processes; it was not properly
deemed an extraneous influence. 66 Though the Tanner defendant
asserted his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial and mentally
competent tribunal and insisted that the intoxicated jury members
denied him that right, the Supreme Court disagreed.67 It opined
that preexisting safeguards—such as the court’s and litigants’
ability to observe jurors, the elimination of unsuitable jurors in
voir dire, and the ability of a party to impeach a verdict by
nonjuror evidence of misconduct—ensured that the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment rights were intact.68 Though the Court in
Tanner was not endorsing the jury’s misconduct as acceptable, it
nonetheless held that Rule 606(b) prevented it from receiving
juror affidavits in support of the defendant’s motion for a new
trial. 69

63. Id.; 1969 Draft, supra note 45.
64. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
65. See generally Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
66. Id. at 122 (explaining that although the jurors’ ingestion of drugs or
alcohol during the trial was improper, that ingestion was “no more an ‘outside
influence’ than a virus, poorly prepared food, or a lack of sleep”).
67. Id. at 127.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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E. BREAKING THE BLACK BOX: PENA-RODRIGUEZ
V. COLORADO
Until March 2017,70 American jurisprudence was in a state
of uncertainty. Forty-two state jurisdictions across the United
States followed the Federal Rule, codified as 606(b), while nine
state jurisdictions followed the Iowa Rule, dating back before the
Legislature’s codification. 71 Within those jurisdictions following
the Iowa Rule, many had exceptions other than those recognized
by Rule 606(b).72 At least sixteen jurisdictions had already
recognized an exception to the no-impeachment doctrine for
instances in which racial bias was expressed during
deliberations. 73 There was also a federal circuit split pre-PenaRodriguez; some circuits held or suggested that an exception
existed for evidence of racial animus, while others declined to
recognize such exception, reasoning that “other safeguards
inherent in the trial process suffice to protect defendants’
constitutional interests.”74 Though the general tendency had been
to unequivocally shield jury deliberations from any
investigation, 75 this nationwide divergence, along with
conflicting drafts within the legislative history of Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b)76 and courts’ recognition of real-world
implications of the no-impeachment doctrine77 left criminal
defendants to decipher what was or was not acceptable within a
criminal jury trial.

70. See generally Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
71. Id. at 865.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (explaining that the First, Ninth, and Seventh Circuits either held
or suggested that an exception existed, while the Tenth, Third, and Fifth
Circuits either held or suggested that exception did not exist).
75. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 860-61 (“In the era of our Nation’s
founding, the right to a jury trial had existed and evolved for centuries, through
and alongside the common law. The jury was considered a fundamental
safeguard of individual liberty . . . . A general rule has evolved to give
substantial protection to verdict finality and to assure jurors that, once their
verdict has been entered, it will not later be called into question based on the
comments or conclusions they expressed during deliberations.”).
76. See discussion supra Section I.C.
77. See generally McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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1. The Story of Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez
Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez was charged with attempted
sexual assault on a child, unlawful sexual contact, and
harassment.78 Though the prosecution presented no physical
evidence and the defendant presented a witness testifying that
Peña-Rodriguez was with him at a different location when the
charged offenses happened, the jury convicted Peña-Rodriguez
for unlawful sexual contact and harassment.79 However, after the
conclusion of the trial, two jurors told defense counsel that Juror
Number 11—Juror H.C.—made “racially biased statements
during deliberations.”80 Juror M.M. stated in an affidavit that
during deliberations, Juror H.C. said, “I think he did it because
he’s Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want.”81
Juror M.M.’s affidavit, along with an affidavit from Juror L.T.,
indicated that Juror H.C. expressed, on multiple occasions,
explicit racial animus towards Mexican men during the jury’s
deliberations. 82
Although the defense asked for an opportunity to investigate
and relitigate the issues in a Motion for New Trial, the trial court
denied the request, opining that the Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b) prohibits the use of juror testimony to demonstrate that
racial bias affected deliberations. 83 Peña-Rodriguez appealed,
arguing that the prohibition did not apply because the testimony
would not be used to uproot the deliberative process, but rather
would elucidate the fact that there was a racist present on the

78. People v. Pena-Rodriguez, 412 P.3d 461, 465 (Colo. App. 2012).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. People v. Pena-Rodriguez, 412 P.3d 461 (Colo. App. 2012), cert.
granted, 2013 WL 12140028 (Jan. 4, 2013) (No. 12SC9).
82. Id. According to these affidavits, Juror H.C. stated, “Mexican men
[are] physically controlling of women because they have a sense of entitlement
and think they can ‘do whatever they want’ with women.” Id. Juror H.C. also
expressed his belief that Pena-Rodriguez was guilty because, “in his
experience as an ex-law enforcement officer, Mexican men had a bravado that
caused them to believe they could do whatever they wanted with women.” Id.
Further, Juror H.C. stated that he did not believe that Pena-Rodriguez’s alibi
witness was “credible” because, among other things, he was “an illegal.” Id.
83. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Pena-Rodriguez, 412 P.3d 461 (No.
12SC0).
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jury. 84 In his petition for writ of certiorari to the Colorado
Supreme Court, Peña-Rodriguez explained that courts have
“engaged in an ‘unceasing effort’ to eradicate racism from [the]
criminal justice system,” and that procedural protections, such as
the peremptory challenge exception established in Batson, serve
to ensure that racism does not pervade criminal jury trials. 85 Thus,
Petitioner argued, the Court should “grant [his] petition because
the court of appeals opinion [was]. . . . inconsistent with [the
nation’s] unceasing efforts to eradicate racial prejudice from [the]
criminal justice system.”86 However, both the Colorado Court of
Appeals and the Colorado Supreme Court denied the defendant’s
request and affirmed the trial court’s decision.87

2. Oral Arguments
On April 4, 2016, the United States Supreme Court granted
Peña-Rodriguez’s petition for writ of certiorari. 88 During oral
arguments, Jeffrey L. Fisher, on behalf of Petitioner PeñaRodriguez, contended that the Court should permit post-trial juror
testimony regarding explicit statements of racial animus when
Tanner’s balancing test so permits. 89 This Tanner analysis, which
relies on factors such as the court’s and litigants’ ability to
observe jurors, the elimination of unsuitable jurors in voir dire,
and the ability of a party to impeach a verdict by nonjuror

84. Id. (arguing that he was denied “the right to a fair trial by an impartial
jury, the due process of law, the equal protection of the law and about every
other basic constitutional right guaranteed to a criminally accused”). Further,
Pena-Rodriguez pleaded that the United States Supreme Court find that the use
of juror statements to impeach a verdict where a juror expressed explicit racial
animus “does not invade the deliberative process.” Id. Instead, such bias is
equivalent to clearly admissible “extraneous prejudicial information.” Id.
85. Id.
86. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Pena-Rodriguez, 412 P.3d 461 (No.
12SC0).
87. See People v. Pena-Rodriguez, 412 P.3d 461, 466 (Colo. App. 2012);
Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 288 (Colo. 2015).
88. Natalie A. Spiess, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado: A Critical, but
Incomplete, Step in the Never-Ending War on Racial Bias, 95 DENV. L. REV.
809, 817 (2018).
89. Transcript of Oral Argument, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct.
855 (2017) (No. 15-606), 2016 WL 5920142, at *11.
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evidence of misconduct,90 would protect the jury’s black box
from exposure beyond instances of explicit racial bias.91
Importantly, Fisher acknowledged that a court is only required to
allow a lawyer to ask on voir dire about racial bias—not bias of
any other kind.92
Though Fisher explained to the Court that the door would
not be opened, but instead could be limited to instances of racebased animus, he acknowledged that Batson was a “helpful
analogy” for further expansion.93 He seemingly acknowledged
that there is room for expansion mimicking the pattern found in
other realms of American history when he encouraged the Court
to “do what the Court’s done in previous situations like this,
which is start with race.”94 Further, Fisher responded to the Court
by saying, “You might conclude – and I’m not going to deny this
– the Court might conclude, as it did in Batson, that you should
extend to sex . . . . that would be a separate case.”95 Respondent
instead pointed the Court to already-present protections available
to defendants during a trial: voir dire and mid-trial reporting. 96

3. The 2017 Supreme Court Decision
Justice Kennedy issued the majority opinion in PenaRodriguez v. Colorado, finding in favor of Petitioner PeñaRodriguez. 97 In the opinion, the Court distinguished between
juror misbehavior, such as the drug and alcohol abuse in Tanner,
and racial bias; the Court explained that though the former is
unacceptable, it represents a moment in which a single juror or
jury has “gone off course” while the latter represents a “familiar
90. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987).
91. Transcript of Oral Argument, Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855 (No.
15-606), 2016 WL 5920142, at *8-9.
92. Id. at *10.
93. Id. at *11 (acknowledging that the Court first issued an opinion about
race in Batson v. Kentucky, then extended that protection to gender several
years later in J.E.B. v. Alabama).
94. Id. at *5.
95. Id. at *12.
96. Transcript of Oral Argument, Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855 (No.
15-606), 2016 WL 5920142, at *49.
(“We think that this is a really serious issue and that it ought to be addressed
through the kinds of safeguards this Court has always applied.”).
97. See generally Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855.
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and recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic
injury to the administration of justice.”98 Therefore, an effort to
rid a criminal jury trial from such evil would not be an attempt to
perfect the jury, but rather would be a valiant effort to ensure
equal treatment under the law.99 Equal treatment in a criminal
jury trial cannot be achieved merely through the mechanisms
courts have relied upon in the past. Safeguards like “voir dire,
observation of juror demeanor and conduct during trial, juror
reports before the verdict, and nonjuror evidence after trial” may
be insufficient to reach this goal. 100 Further, questions about
impartiality during voir dire might not only prove insufficient but
also damaging, “exacerbat[ing] whatever prejudice might exist
without substantially aiding in exposing it.”101
The Court adopted Petitioner’s proposed inquiry. 102 A party
must show: (1) that one or more jurors made statements
“exhibiting overt racial bias,” (2) that those statements “cast
serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality” of the deliberations
and verdict, and (3) that those statements tend to show that racial
animus was a “significant motivating factor” in the juror’s
decision to convict the defendant.103 The Court refrained from
answering what a trial court must use when determining whether
this threshold has been satisfied, instead reserving “substantial
discretion” to such court.104

III. THE EXPANSION OF RACIAL PROTECTIONS TO
GENDER PROTECTIONS
A glaring gap in American law arose following the 2017
Pena-Rodriguez105 decision.
Although Pena-Rodriguez
established a clear, three-element standard for when post-trial
juror testimony is appropriate,106 the decision created an air of
uncertainty because while it only explicitly rebuked racial
98. Id. at 868.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 869.
102. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See generally Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855.
106. Id. at 869.
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animus, it provided language suggesting that because of our
Nation’s history, gender animus would be equally poisonous.107
The exception forged in Pena-Rodriguez—designed to eliminate
the “familiar and recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would
risk systemic injury to the administration of justice”—was
constructed to be leveraged and extended, reaching other
expressions of animus that are “familiar and recurring evil[s].”108
Significantly, this is not the first time a state of uncertainty
has arisen when a court granted a right to one class before
granting that same right to another class. In the realm of
peremptory challenges, this Nation’s criminal justice system
experienced the development and evolution of protections first
against race-based challenges, then against gender-based
challenges.109 Thus, essential in understanding the breadth of
meaningful prohibitions against biases in criminal jury trials—
and in understanding this Note’s argument—is the historical
evolution of protections surrounding peremptory challenges.

A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE PROTECTIONS: PROGRESS IN
AMERICAN COMMON-LAW
The prohibition of race-based discrimination of veniremen
began in 1879, when, in Strauder v. West Virginia, the United
States Supreme Court opined that the Fourteenth Amendment—
and the fundamental principles of equal protection—required the
abolition of a state statute preventing all African-American men,
who were otherwise qualified to serve as jurors, from serving in
that role.110 Notably, the Court explained that by denying these
individuals the right to participate in the administration of the law,
the statute was operating as a “brand,” an “assertion of [AfricanAmerican mens’] inferiority,” and a “stimulant to [racial]
107. Id. at 871 (“It is the mark of a maturing legal system that it seeks to
understand and to implement the lessons of history. The Court now seeks to
strengthen the broader principle that society can and must move forward by
achieving the thoughtful, rational dialogue at the foundation of both the jury
system and the free society that sustains our Constitution.”).
108. Id. at 868.
109. See discussion infra Section III.
110. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-09 (1879), abrogated
by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the
race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all
others.”111
Nearly a century later in Swain v. Alabama, an AfricanAmerican defendant convicted of rape invoked the protection
created in Strauder.112 Prior to Swain, many courts had
consistently applied Strauder’s protection.113 In Carter v. Texas,
the Court held that where a state action excludes all members of
a race, solely based on their race or color, from serving as jurors
in a criminal trial, the principles of equal protection are denied.114
Similarly, in Smith v. Texas the Court explained that when
discrimination excludes jurors merely because of their race, “our
Constitution and the laws enacted under it” are violated.115
Further, such discrimination is “at war with our basic concepts of
a democratic society and a representative government.”116
The Court in Swain acknowledged that the protection created
in Strauder was rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause, but it nevertheless perpetuated the preStrauder mentality, accepting that peremptory challenges are
frequently employed based on irrelevant characteristics like race,
religion, nationality, occupation, or affiliations. 117 Additionally,
the Court opined that inquiries into a party’s peremptory
challenge would unnecessarily subject that party to “scrutiny for
reasonableness and sincerity[,]” discouraging the use of such
challenges altogether.118 Thus, the defendant’s equal protection
claim was denied with the majority opinion affirming the validity
111. Id. (“The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly
denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as
jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other
respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law,
an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is
an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which
the law aims to secure to all others.”).
112. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1965), overruled by
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
113. Id. at 204.
114. Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900); see also Swain, 380 U.S.
at 204.
115. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940); see also Swain, 380 U.S.
at 204.
116. Smith, 311 U.S. at 130.
117. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220-21.
118. Id. at 221-22.
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of the state’s peremptory challenges.119 The dissenting opinion—
which characterized the majority’s opinion as “unthinkable”—
highlighted the concept of equality from Strauder, quoting, “The
very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the peers or
equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to
determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons
having the same legal status in society as that which he holds.”120

B. A PROTECTION AGAINST RACE-BASED
DISCRIMINATION: BATSON V. KENTUCKY
In 1986, a prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to
strike all African-American veniremen during jury selection for a
African-American defendant’s trial. 121 The defendant argued that
the prosecutor’s use of the challenges violated his rights under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because it prevented him from
having a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community and
denied him equal protection of the laws.122 The trial court judge
denied the defendant’s motion, and the jury convicted the
defendant of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen
goods.123
Though a criminal defendant is not entitled to a perfect
124
jury, a criminal defendant is entitled to a trial by jurors who
were “selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria.”125
Further, “[p]urposeful racial discrimination in selection of the
venire violates a defendant’s right to equal protection because it
denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to
secure.”126 Thus, because race is wholly unrelated to a person’s

119. Id. at 227-28.
120. Id. at 230-31 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (quoting Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)).
121. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82-83 (1986).
122. Id. at 83.
123. Id. at 82-83.
124. See id. at 85-86 (explaining that a defendant has no right to a jury
composed entirely or partially of persons of his own race (citing Strauder, 100
U.S. at 305)).
125. Id.
126. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
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competency as a juror,127 the United States Supreme Court in
Batson held that the freedom associated with peremptory
challenges must yield to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause and that such challenges based solely on racial
biases are forbidden. 128 This prohibition—which created a key
protectionary measure against race-based animus in the jury
selection process—honored the idea that discrimination in jury
selection would not only harm the defendant and the excluded
juror, but also the entire community. 129

C. EXPANDING BATSON’S PROTECTION: A
HISTORICAL EXPOSITION
Less than ten years later, the United States Supreme Court
expanded Batson’s protection and identified gender-based
discrimination as being equally as repugnant as race-based
discrimination.130 In J.E.B. v. Alabama, the petitioner utilized
Batson when arguing that the state’s use of peremptory challenges
against male jurors in a paternity and child support action against
him violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.131 Axiomatic to the Court’s opinion was the
principle that intentional discrimination has no place in our
judicial system132 and that it is “invidious,” “archaic,” and
perpetuates “overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities” of
members of the class being discriminated against.133
J.E.B’s protections—though unprecedented and prolific—
followed Batson naturally, mimicking America’s historical trend
to first legitimize persons persecuted because of their race, then
liberate women oppressed because of their gender.134 The 1865
127. Id. at 87 (“A person’s race simply is ‘unrelated to his fitness as a
juror.’” (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).
128. Id. at 89.
129. Id. at 87 (explaining that “[s]election procedures that purposefully
exclude [African-American] persons from juries undermine public confidence
in the fairness of our system of justice.”).
130. See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
131. Id. at 129.
132. Id. at 140.
133. Id. at 130-31.
134. See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994); cf. Lynn
Yeakel, Struggle for Women’s Rights and Civil Rights Linked, HUFFPOST
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ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment 135 was followed in 1867
by the first Reconstruction Act, which “enfranchise[d] [AfricanAmerican] males and [ ] disenfranchise[d] large numbers of white
voters.”136 Momentum sparked by similar legislation nationwide
led to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment—and its
Equal Protection Clause—in 1868,137 which would later be the
authority to which petitioners in Swain, Strauder, Carter, Smith,
Batson, and J.E.B. would cling. 138 Two years later the Fifteenth
Amendment was ratified, providing that voting rights “shall not
be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.”139 Although the first woman suffrage bill
was introduced in Wyoming that same year,140 courts nationwide
still expressed incredulity at the idea that women, like men, would
be allowed to vote.141
Though Strauder—in 1879—represented a pivotal step
forward in eliminating intentional acts of racial bias in jury
selection, it simultaneously reinforced the nation’s perception of

(AUG. 20, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/lynn-yeakel/march-onwashington_b_3769211.html [https://perma.cc/579D-VVGF] (“[T]he fight for
racial equality is intertwined in the fight for women’s equality in our country’s
history.”).
135. Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,
50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (1952).
136. Douglas H. Bryant, Unorthodox and Paradox: Revisiting the
Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 555, 566 (2002).
137. See Gressman, supra note 135, at 1333.
138. See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965),
overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128 (1940); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1; Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 570
U.S. 529, 536 (2013).
140. May Schons, Woman Suffrage, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (JAN. 21, 2011),
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/news/woman-suffrage/
[https://perma.cc/G7EV-3FY2] (noting, though, that some politicians thought
granting such legislation would be the “greatest hilarity” and “originated in a
joke”).
141. See, e.g., Winans v. Williams, 5 Kan. 227, 229 (Kan. 1869) (“We
hardly suppose it necessary to enter upon an argument of this question, as
probably no lawyer in the state, whatever his opinion may be upon the general
question of ‘woman suffrage,’ seriously thinks that women have a legal right
to vote . . . .”).
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women as an inferior class.142 Other opinions followed Strauder,
justifying the exclusion of women from jury service by pointing
to antiquated laws prohibiting all female jurors, even after
passage of the Nineteenth Amendment.143 Over the next sixtyfive years, the woman suffrage movement would continue to
shadow the Civil Rights Movement.144 Where the Civil Rights
Movement featured key events such as the passage of Brown v.
Board of Education in 1954,145 Rosa Parks’ boycott on a
Montgomery bus in 1955,146 the Birmingham Campaign of 1963
which featured marches, sit-ins, and boycotts,147 and the March
on Washington that same year when Martin Luther King Jr.
delivered his famous “I Have a Dream” speech, 148 the women’s
rights movement featured similar demonstrations nationwide,
highlighting issues such as suffrage, the portrayal of women’s
role in society, and states’ failure to ratify the 1972 Equal Rights

142. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310 (explaining that though a state shall
not exclude jurors based on their race, it “may confine the selection to males.”).
143. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 289 (1947) (explaining that “for
nearly a half-century after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, it was
universal practice in the United States to allow only men to sit on juries”); Hoyt
v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 60 (1961) (explaining that states may confine jury duty
to men, that this principle has “gone unquestioned” for over eighty years, and
that requiring women—but not men—to affirmatively register for jury service
was not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment). It is also essential to note
that one suffragist, Carrie Chapman Catt, summarized the woman suffrage
movement prior to the Nineteenth Amendment’s enactment as costly, saying
“To get the word ‘male’ in effect out of the Constitution cost the women of the
country fifty-two years of pauseless campaign . . . . During that time they were
forced to conduct fifty-six . . . campaigns to get Legislatures to submit suffrage
amendments to voters; 47 campaigns to get State constitutional conventions to
write woman suffrage into state constitutions; 277 campaigns to get State party
conventions to include woman suffrage planks . . . in party platforms, and 19
campaigns with 19 successive Congresses.” Johanna Neuman, The Campaign
to Win the Vote for Women: Why Social Change Takes Time, FROM THE
SQUARE (MAR. 1, 2018), https://www.fromthesquare.org/gilded-suffragistswomens-history-month/#.W9nq5WhKhPY [https://perma.cc/EAK7-TNDN].
144. See Yeakel, supra note 134.
145. See generally Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
146. Cheryl Bond-Nelms, Boycotts, Movement and Marches: Events
That Initiated Social Change During the Civil Rights Movement, AARP (FEB.
9, 2018), https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/history/info-2018/civil-rightsevents-fd.html#quest1 [https://perma.cc/8DQJ-BRQ2].
147. Id.
148. Id.
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Amendment which would have guaranteed women the same
rights as men.149
The oppression faced by African Americans and women
were similar in that both classes were prohibited from holding
elected positions, voting, serving on juries, independently
bringing suit, holding or conveying property, and serving as legal
guardians of their own children.150 Though differences in their
sufferings certainly existed, it is irrelevant—for the purposes of
eliminating intentional discrimination against either class in a
criminal jury trial—to “determine . . . whether women or racial
minorities have suffered more at the hands of discriminatory state
actors during the decades of our Nation’s history.”151 Rather, it
is only important to recognize that our Nation has endured a long
history of discrimination. 152 Moreover, in light of the “injustice”
that this discrimination has “wreaked” on our Nation, intentional
discrimination by litigants on the basis of gender “invites
cynicism respecting the jury’s neutrality and its obligation to
adhere to the law.”153

IV. THE PENA-RODRIGUEZ EFFECT: APPLYING THE
FRAMEWORK OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES TO
POST-TRIAL JUROR TESTIMONY
The civil law, as well as nature herself, has always
recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and
destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman’s
protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and
149. Megan Gibson, The Suffrage Movement, TIME (AUG. 12, 2011),
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2088114_208
7975_2087964,00.html [https://perma.cc/3ZRJ-HZ2H]; Megan Gibson, The
‘Bra Burning’ Miss America Protest, TIME (AUG. 12, 2011),
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2088114_208
7975_2087965,00.html [https://perma.cc/97NR-7EAB]; Megan Gibson, The
Ladies
Home
Journal
Sit-In,
TIME
(AUG.
12,
2011),
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2088114_208
7975_2087966,00.html [https://perma.cc/ZZZ6-ZH9R]; Megan Gibson, The
Equal Rights Amendment Marches, TIME (AUG. 12, 2011),
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2088114_208
7975_2087972,00.html [https://perma.cc/8Q72-96V2].
150. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 140 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. at 412)
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delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it
for many of the occupations of civil life . . . . The paramount
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator.154

The development of these peremptory challenge protections
exist as a meaningful—and prudent—precedent. The Court has
before been comfortable applying a race-based protection to
create an identical gender-based protection, 155 so it follows
sensically that the race-based protection created in PenaRodriguez could be applied to create an identical gender-based
protection. As early as 1851, the Supreme Court in Reid
recognized that circumstances would arise where the denial of
post-trial juror testimony would violate the “plainest” principles
of justice.156 Over a century later, the Pena-Rodriguez court
identified racial discrimination as one of those circumstances. 157
However, Reid158 and Pena-Rodriguez159 must be viewed in
conjunction with Bates160 and J.E.B.161 Such a cohesive analysis
manifests that the American jury system must not permit
stereotypes to presuppose the abilities—or guilt—of members of
the class being discriminated against.162
Where racial
discrimination cannot lie, neither can discrimination based on
gender.
Notably, the Supreme Court premised its J.E.B. opinion on
the principles fundamental to the Nation and to its criminal justice
system: equal opportunity, democracy, equality, and equal
protection.163 It explained that communities are “harmed by the
State’s participation in the perpetuation of invidious group
154. Id. at 133 (quoting Bradwell v. State, 83 Wall. 130, 141 (1873)).
155. See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
156. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1851).
157. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017) (“The
unmistakable principle underlying these precedents is that discrimination on
the basis of race, ‘odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the
administration of justice.’”) (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555
(1979).
158. See generally Reid, 53 U.S. 361.
159. See generally Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855.
160. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
161. See generally J.E.B., 511 U.S. 127.
162. Id. at 130-31.
163. Id. at 145-46.
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stereotypes and the inevitable loss of confidence in our judicial
system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the courtroom
engenders.”164 The Court’s fear of a nation in which citizens
might still be discriminated against on the basis of gender
propelled the opinion, with the Court explaining:
Failing to provide [citizens] the same protection against
gender discrimination as race discrimination could frustrate
the purpose of Batson itself . . . . Equal opportunity to
participate in the fair administration of justice is fundamental
to our democratic system. It not only furthers the goals of
the jury system. It reaffirms the promise of equality under
the law—that all citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, or
gender, have the chance to take part directly in our
democracy.165

Additionally, the opinion stymied the conception that
historically-held roles must eternalize; the Court explained that
discrimination merely “serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious,
archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of
men and women.”166 Thus, the Court distanced itself from the
stereotypical “spheres and destinies” of men and women and from
the idea that women have no role to play in the administration of
justice. 167 The Supreme Court recognized that such stereotypes
were “unconstitutional prox[ies] for juror competence and
impartiality. 168
Though understanding the fundamental principles driving
the J.E.B. opinion is essential, this Note’s analysis requires more.
Rather, a line-by-line analysis of the opinion’s text demonstrates
how this language could—and should—be applied to expand
Pena-Rodriguez. The language is artful and easily adaptable; it
is fully capable of eliminating gender animus from jury
deliberations as gracefully as it originally eradicated gender
animus from peremptory challenges.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 140.
Id. at 145-46.
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 131 (emphasis added).
Id. at 133 (quoting Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130, 141 (1873).
Id. at 129.
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J.E.B.’s Language Expanding
Pena-Rodriguez

We shall not accept as a defense
to gender-based peremptory
challenges “the very stereotype
the law condemns.”169

We shall not accept as a defense
to [explicit statements of gender
bias] “the very stereotype the
law condemns.”

[Protecting
gender-based
peremptory challenges] urges
this Court to condone the same
stereotypes that justified the
wholesale exclusion of women
from juries and the ballot box.170

Protecting [explicit statements
of gender bias] urges this Court
to condone the same stereotypes
that justified the wholesale
exclusion of women from juries
and the ballot box.

Discrimination in jury selection,
whether based on race or on
gender, causes harm to the
litigants, the community, and the
individual jurors who are
wrongfully
excluded
from
participation in the judicial
process.171

Discrimination
in
[jury
deliberations], whether based on
race or on gender, causes harm to
the litigants, the community, and
the individual [defendants] who
are wrongfully [convicted based
on their gender] in the judicial
process.

The litigants are harmed by the
risk that the prejudice that
motivated the discriminatory
selection of the jury will infect
the entire proceedings.172

The litigants are harmed by the
risk that the prejudice that
motivated
the
[jury
deliberations] will infect the
entire proceedings.

169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 138 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. at 410).
Id. at 139.
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140.
Id.
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When state actors exercise
peremptory
challenges
in
reliance on gender stereotypes,
they ratify and reinforce
prejudicial views of the relative
abilities of men and women. 173

When
[jurors]
exercise
[deliberations] in reliance on
gender stereotypes, they ratify
and reinforce prejudicial views
of the relative abilities of men
and women.

Because [stereotypes about the
abilities of men and women]
have wreaked injustice in so
many other spheres of our
country’s public life, active
discrimination by litigants on the
basis of gender during jury
selection “invites cynicism
respecting the jury’s neutrality
and its obligation to adhere to the
law.”174
Discriminatory
use
of
peremptory challenges may
create the impression that the
judicial system has acquiesced in
suppressing full participation by
one gender or that the “deck has
been stacked” in favor of one
side. 175

Because [stereotypes about the
abilities of men and women]
have wreaked injustice in so
many other spheres of our
country’s public life, active
discrimination by [jurors] on the
basis of gender during [jury
deliberations] “invites cynicism
respecting the jury’s neutrality
and its obligation to adhere to the
law.”
Discriminatory use of [explicit
statements of gender bias] may
create the impression that the
judicial system has acquiesced in
suppressing full participation by
one gender or that the “deck has
been stacked in favor of one
side.”

Striking individual jurors on the
assumption that they hold
particular views simply because
of their gender is “practically a
brand upon them, affixed by the
law, an assertion of their
inferiority.”176

[Convicting defendants] on the
assumption that they hold
particular views simply because
of their gender is “practically a
brand upon them, affixed by the
law, and assertion of their
inferiority.”

173.
174.
175.
176.
at 308).

Id.
Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. at 412).
Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. at 413).
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
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This exercise establishes a simple truth: J.E.B.’s extension
of Batson is an obvious and natural scheme under which PenaRodriguez should be extended to expose explicit statements of
gender bias during jury deliberations. Though a critic might
argue that any language could be interposed in any opinion, thus
justifying that opinion’s expansion, this Note’s demonstration is
uniquely persuasive because the Batson, J.E.B., and PenaRodriguez decisions all share the same history of invidious
discrimination.177 Similarly, the fundamental principles evoked
in the J.E.B. opinion—equal opportunity, democracy, equality,
and equal protection178—were similarly referenced in PenaRodriguez.179 Thus, the ease with which J.E.B.’s language can be
interchanged with language prohibiting explicit statements of
gender bias in jury deliberations is not accidental or unproductive;
J.E.B.’s language is a key precipice on which this Note’s
proposed expansion should rest.

V. THE PENA-RODRIGUEZ EXPANSION: A NARROW
APPROACH
Although in J.E.B., the Supreme Court uses language
identifying discrimination by state actors as unacceptable, 180 the
case’s protections extend to private actors’ discrimination in the
jury selection process as well. 181 In United States v. Martinez, the
defendant argued that the holding in J.E.B. should be narrowly
construed to apply only to the government’s use of gender-based
peremptory strikes. 182 If the defendant’s argument had been
177. See discussion supra Section III.
178. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 145-46.
179. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867-68 (2017)
(explaining that permitting post-trial juror testimony to expose explicit
statements of racial bias was required to uphold the Nation’s commitment to
“equal dignity of all persons” and to guarantee “the equal protection of the
laws”).
180. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 130-31 (“Today we reaffirm what, by now,
should be axiomatic: Intentional discrimination on the basis of gender by state
actors violates the Equal Protection Clause, particularly where, as here, the
discrimination serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad
stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women.”) (emphasis added).
181. United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2010).
182. Id. at 106.
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successful, then Martinez would undermine this Note’s argument
because there is certainly no government actor within the jury’s
black box. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that the defendant in Martinez was incorrect,
explaining that “the Constitution bars a [private citizen] defendant
in a criminal case from exercising peremptory challenges based
on gender . . . . [because] [t]here is no principled basis for
distinguishing between civil and criminal cases for these
purposes, or between the exercise of a peremptory strike by the
government and a defendant.”183 Additionally, Pena-Rodriguez
protects criminal defendants from the discriminatory actions of
private actors.184 Therefore, J.E.B.’s language, establishing a
protection against gender-based discrimination by both
government and private actors at the forefront of a criminal trial’s
jury process, is certainly an appropriate framework for expanding
Pena-Rodriguez to gender-discrimination by private actors at the
rear of that same criminal trial.
Further, a slippery slope critique—the argument that
expanding Pena-Rodriguez to gender will initiate further
expansions to other classes, exposing juries and undermining the
secrecy of deliberations in criminal trials—would be utterly
unfounded. In J.E.B., Justice Scalia’s dissent expressed a
warning that the majority’s opinion would later be expanded
beyond gender,185 “spawn[ing] a wave of collateral litigation”186
Similarly, in Pena-Rodriguez, Justice Alito cautioned that the
Court’s decision could not successfully “limit the degree of
intrusion” into the black box, setting the stage for further
expansion.187 However, the fears of the Court were “vastly
overstated.”188 Though a few lower courts have extended J.E.B.’s
protection to religion, 189 courts have been “extremely reluctant to
extend the supervision of Batson and J.E.B. to peremptory strikes
183. Id. at 107 (emphasis added).
184. See generally Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
185. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 162 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186. Susan Hightower, Sex and the Peremptory Strike: An Empirical
Analysis of J.E.B. v. Alabama’s First Five Years, 52 STAN. L. REV. 895, 896
(2000).
187. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 875 (Alito, J., dissenting).
188. Hightower, supra note 185 at 896 (“If attempts to comply with
J.E.B. and prevent discrimination against women in jury service have thrown
the court system into turmoil, it is not revealed in the case law.”).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 64, 668 (2d Cir. 2003).
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against other categories of jurors.”190 Instead, it is evident that
“neither the Supreme Court nor lower courts around the country
have slid far down the slippery slope of Batson extensions that
doomsayers foretold in the wake of J.E.B.”191 Because this Note
argues that courts should expand Pena-Rodriguez to gender using
J.E.B.’s framework, any slippery slope concerns would likely
never come to fruition when analogized with the seeming void of
unwanted expansion following J.E.B.192
Finally, any plea to leave evidentiary traditions undisturbed
would be gravely misplaced in American society. However, such
pleas in response to this Note’s argument would not be unique.
Justice Scalia’s dissent in J.E.B.193 and Justice Alito’s dissent in
Pena-Rodriguez194 contain such arguments. In J.E.B., Justice
Scalia explained, “the Court imperils a practice [of peremptory
challenges] that has been considered an essential part of fair jury
trial since the dawn of the common law. The Constitution of the
United States neither requires nor permits this vandalizing of our
people’s traditions.”195 In Pena-Rodriguez, Justice Alito opined
that even where a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights are at
stake, “long-established rules stand in the way” of that
defendant’s “critical need to obtain and introduce evidence of [a
juror’s discriminatory statements].”196
However, these longstanding rules must not embrace rigidity
and instead must reflect the historical progression of civil rights,
which has bent and broken traditions to comport with updated
conceptions of fairness.197 Reid foreshadowed this in 1851:
“[C]ases might arise in which it would be impossible to refuse
[evidence] without violating the plainest principles of justice.” 198
As American society has evolved, the Nation’s “principles of
justice” have also evolved, necessitating that evidentiary rules
comport with those newly-recognized principles in the interest of

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Hightower, supra note 185 at 903.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 904.
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 163 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 874 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting).
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 163 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 874 (Alito, J., dissenting).
See discussion supra Section III.
United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1851).
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“justice.”199 Thus, the extension of civil rights from race to
gender in both the courts and beyond should also be reflected
within the jury’s black box.

IV. CONCLUSION
The unfortunate truth is that where invidious racial inequity
lies, so too does gender inequity often rest.200 Rather than
granting relief to victims of gender bias in the delayed fashion
that has been predominant throughout American history, where
progress for women has trailed slowly behind relief granted by
courts to African Americans, Pena-Rodriguez provides a brightline framework that courts could easily apply to both explicit
racial and gender animus. 201 The burden suffered by African
Americans and women does not require comparison to understand
that relief from discrimination for the two classes may coexist.
Thus, the exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) created
by Pena-Rodriguez should not only be applied to explicit racial
bias, but also to explicit gender bias, tracking the American
tradition of extending protections and rights first to African
Americans, then to women. Specifically, the Court’s prohibition
of racial animus, followed by that of gender animus, in
peremptory challenges suggests that the same extension in juror
deliberations follows naturally. Logically, why would the Court
admonish gender discrimination at the forefront of a criminal trial
while lauding it at the conclusion of the same trial? Because such
an inconsistency would perpetuate the evil of animus, denying
equal dignity to all persons and falling victim to the odious and
pernicious nature of discrimination,202 the exception created in
Pena-Rodriguez must certainly extend to instances of explicit
gender-based discrimination in juror deliberations.
KATIE HICKS

199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
See discussion supra Section III.
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
Id. at 867-68.

